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Message Text

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R 121215Z DEC 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9308
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4843
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 6928

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOL, NATO
SUBJ: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING DECEMBER 10, 1974: RESTRICTED
SESSION AGENDA ITEM VII

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

BEGIN SUMMARY. SYG LUNS PRESENTED HIS OVERALL SUMMARY APPRAISAL AS REPORTED IN USNATO 6716. THE SUMMARY APPRAISAL WAS RECEIVED WITHOUT COMMENT. RESPONSES BY ALLIED DEFENSE MINISTERS FOLLOWING THE SYG REMARKS FOLLOW. END SUMMARY.

1. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S AP-
PRAISAL IN WHICH HE HAD REMARKED ABOUT UNCERTAINTIES OF THE LEGS
OF THE NATO TRIAD. SECDEF GAVE ASSURANCES THAT THERE WERE INDEED
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NO UNCERTAINTIES CONCERNING OUR COMMITMENT OF THE STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR LEGS OR IN OUR CONFIDENCE TO USE THESE FORCES IF REQUIRED. WE WILL IN FACT BE IMPROVING THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR LEG BY ENHANCING ITS DISCRIMINATION AND INVULNERABILITY. SECDEF MEN-

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TIONED ARMS CONTROL, EMPHASIZING THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE AIMED AT IMPOSING MUTUAL RESTRAINTS AND REDUCTIONS WKHICH SERVE TO ENHANCE SECURITY. THERE IS A POPULAR IDEA THAT ARMS CONTROL IS A VARIANT FOR CUTTING DEFENSE BUDGETS, BUT THIS IS NOT SO. THE SOVIETS WILL NOT GIVE US A "RABBIT IN THE HAT" THAT WOULD ALLOW US TO REDUCE DEFENSE BUDGETS. HE DESCRIBED THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT HE MADE IN GERMANY ABOUT THE US PLANS TO INCREASE COMBAT CAPABILITY THERE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE NUNN AMENDMENT. THE SOVIET REACTION WAS PREDICTABLE, INDIGNANT AND ENTIRELY DEFENSIVE.

2. MINISTER VREDELING (NETHERLANDDS) CITED THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WHICH FACE THE NETHERLANDS AND OTHER COUNTRIES AND INDICATED THAT THESE GIVE RISE TO THE NEED FOR STRENGTHENING COOPERATION IN THE ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN AREA, AND HE NOTED SOME FAVORABLE TRENDS HERE. HE COMPLIMENTED THE US ON INCREASING ITS COMBAT CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE. HE OBSERVED THAT BURDENSHARING HAS APPARENTLY LOST ITS CRITICAL NATURE. HE REFERRED TO THE US REEVALUATION AFFECTING THE NUCLEAR COMPONENT OF NATO FORCES AND INDICATED THAT THIS WAS TIMELY AND ITS RESULTS SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN NATO. HE CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS BY DISCUSSING AN ATTITUDE THAT IS RECEIVING INCREASING ATTENTION IN THE NETHERLANDS, BOTH IN PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENTAL CIRECLES, WHICH ADVOCATES "PUSHING BACK THE ROLE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO." HE STATED THAT THIS WAS DERIVED FROM HUMANITARIAN, IDEOLOGICAL, AND POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS, NOT MILITARY GROUNDS. THIS ATTUDTUDE IS BEHIND RECENT EFFORTS OF THE NETHERLANDS TO REDUCE ITS NUCLEAR CAPABLE FORCES. THE PURCHASE OF THE NON-NUCLEAR LANCE ALSO RELATES TO THIS ATTITUDE. IT WOULD ALSO BE DESIRABLE TO PROVIDE FOR THE "EARLY INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS."

3. MINISTER LEBER (FRG) STATED THAT THERE IS A NEED TO DEFINE THE THRESHOLD OF FORCES BELOW WHICH NATO MUST NOT BE PERMITTED TO DROP. THIS THRESHOLD MUST BE DERIVED FROM OUR OWN OBJECTIVES AND AN EVALUATION OF THE WARSAW PACT THREAT. THE OTHER SIDE CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPLOIT PUBLIC MOODS WHICH OPPOSE THE MAINTENANCE OF DEFENSE, BUT IT IS OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO RECOGNIZE AND SHAPE PUBLIC OPINION. HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO MOD VREDELING'S

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REMARKS ABOUT IDELOGOY, AND STATED FLATLY THAT WE MUST OPPOSE SUCH IDEOLOGY WITH REALITIES. ON THE QUESTION OF RENOUNCING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, HE SAID THAT THOSE THAT ADVOCATE THIS SHOULD BE PREPARED TO COMPENSATE NATO BY CONTRIBUTING ADDITIONAL CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES. ALL OPTIONS IN ALL THREE TRIAD FIELDS SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN. HE GAVE CLEAR WARNING OF THE DANGERS OF WEAKENING NATO CAPABILITIES. HE SAID THAT THENATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT IS SOUND BUT IT REQUIRES ADEQUATE FORCES TO IMPLEMENT IT. HE NOTED THAT MOSCOW HAS CALLED NATO'S ACTIONS TOWARD RATIONALIZATION/STANDARDIZATION AN ARMS BUILDUP - THEY RECOGNIZE ITS VALUE. ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHERTHE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE IS THE PROPER ONE, HE SAID THIS MUST BE THE SUBJECT OF EVALUATION ANDANY PROPOSED CHANGES MUST BE FULLY DISCUSSED IN THE ALLIANCE; IT IS

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ALSO IMPORTANT TO CONSIDER FULLY MBFR ASPECTS.

4. MINISTER MASON (UK) STATED THAT THE UK RECOGNIZES A CONVENTIONAL DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN THE CENTRAL FRONT. THEREFORE THE UK WILL NOT WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM THE CENTRAL FRONT OUTSIDE OF MBFR AGREEMENT. HE WELCOMED THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF US INTENTIONS TO INCREASE COMBAT CAPABILITIES IN EUORPE. TURNING TO VREDELING'S REMARKS, HE STATED THAT IF TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WERE "PUSHED BACK", IT WOULD SHATTER THE TRIAD, LOWER THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD AND DENY NATO THE ABILITY IT NOW HAS TO RESPOND IN ANY WAY TO AGGRESSION. HE STATED THAT THERE MAY WELL BE MORE WARHEADS IN EUROPE THAN ARE NEEDED, BUT THIS IS A MATTER FOR THE US TO REVIEW AND FOR THE NPG TO CONSIDER. ANY REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS BE ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS, NOT UNILATERAL, AND NOT BEFORE MBFR, AGREEMENT. IF THE NETHERLANDS' ATTITUDE SHOULD PREVAIL AND SPREAD TO OTHER COUNTRIES, IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE ALLIANCE.

5. MINISTER VAN DEN BOEYNANTS, REFERRING TO VREDELING'S COMMENTS, STATED THATTHE SAME PROBLEM EXISTS IN BELGIUM. HE HAS TOLD THOSE WHO ADVOCATE THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES THAT WE WOULD THEN HAVE TO ACQUIRE CONVENTIONAL PARITY WITH THE WARSAW PACT AND THIS WILL REQUIRE US TO TELL PARLIAMENT THAT WE WILL NEED TWO AND ONE HALF TIMES THE AMOUNT OF CURRENT DEFENSE BUDGET AND MANPOWER LEVELS. HE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT CAPABLE OF GETTING HIS COUNTRY TO ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSITION.. WITHOUT COMPENSATION, ONE COULD ONLY

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CONSIDER A REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AS IRRESPONSIBLE. IT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF EMPTYING THE ALLIANCE OF ITS STRENGTH AND THEREFORE WOULD TEMPT OUR ENEMIES TO ENGAGE IN ADVENTURISM. IN HIS OPINION, THE SUREST WAY TO AVOID THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS FOR OUR ENEMIES KNOW THAT WE HAVE THEM AND ARE PREPARED TO USE THEM IF REQUIRED.

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R 121215Z DEC 74
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9309
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4844
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT

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LIMDIS

6. MINSTER FORLANI (ITALY) CITED ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AS AF-
FECTNG DEFENSE, BUT ITALY IS DOING ITS PART IN MAINTAINING ITS
CONTRIBUTION. HE MENTIONED PARTICULARLY THE CURRENT EFFORTS TO
MODERNIZE THE NAVY ABOVE AND BEYOND THE NORMAL MAINTENANCE
OF DEFENSE FORCES. HE ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH THE REMARKS OF THE
PREVIOUS SPEAKERS CONCEERNING THE NATI-NUCLEAR ATTITUDE IN THE
NETHERLANDS; IT WOULD BE ILLUSORY TO GIVE UP OUR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.

7. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER STATED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A BASIS
BY WHICH THE US COULD AGREE WITH THE POSITIONS OF ALL OF THE
MINISTERS WHO HAD SPOKEN PREVIOUSLY. THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME
DISAGREEMENT IN THE DEGREE OF EMPHASIS AND APPARENTLY SOME MIS-
UNDERSTANDING AS WELL. HE STATED HIS AGREEMENT WITH MINISTER VAN
DEN BOEYNANTS THAT IF THERE SHOULD BE ANY DOUBT ON THE PART OF THE
SOVIET UNION ABOUT OUR CAPABILITIES OR INTENTIONS, OR IF THEY SHOULD
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PERCEIVE ANY GAPS IN THE DETERRENT SPECTRUM, THEY WILL EXPLOIT
THEM. DETERRENCE MUST EXIST ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF RISK,
AND OUR ENTIRE FORCE STRUCTURE MUST BE PREPARRED TO ACT ACROSS
THAT SPECTRUM. HE EXPLAINED THE REASONS THATTHE US HAS PLACED
EMPHASIS ON BUILDING CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES; NOTED THAT IN THE
1950S THE US HAD A NEAR MONOPOLY IN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES; IN THE
1960S THERE WERE DEBATES ABOUT SUBSTITUTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR
CONVENTIONAL FORCES, BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE CAN BE NO SUCH
SUBSTITUTION; RATHER THEY ARE MUTUALLY REINFORCING IN A SYNER-
GISTIC WAY. REFERRING TO VREDELING'S COMMENTS ABOUT PUSHING
BACK THE NUCLEAR ROLE, SECDEF CHOSE TO INTERPRET THIS AS MEANING
THAT THE NETHERLANDS WANTS TO DISCOURAGE EXCESSIVE DEPENDENCE ON
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WE WOULD AGREE WITH SUCH AN OBSERVA-
TION. BUT WE MUST IN ANY EVENT BROADEN THE ARRAY OF OPTIONS WE
HAVE AND CONVEY THE PERCEPTION OF OUR STRENGTH TO OUR POTENTIAL
ENEMIES. WE CANNOT ACHIEVE THE HIGH NUCLEAR THRESHOLD WE WOULD
ALL LIKE TO HAVE WITHOUT MAINTAINING ADEQUATE AND BALANCED FORCES;
DETERRENCE IS A SEAMLESS WEB.

8. COMMENTING ON THE BURDENSHARING QUESTION, SECDEF STATED THAT

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THE JACKSON-NUNN AMENDMENT HAS BEEN SATISFIED FOR THIS FISCAL YEAR: HOWEVER, IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF BOOKKEEPING BUT RATHER OF THE PERCEPTION IN THE US OF HOW ADEQUATELY THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SPEND FOR DEFENSE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE CANNOT CONDONE, OR JUSTIFY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, REDUCTIONS IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE BUDGETS THAT COME BELOW 3 OR 3 1/2 PERCENT OF GNP. HE STATED THAT ECONOMIC AND ENERGY PROBLEMS DO NOT DRIVE THE ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR DEFENSE, BUT POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND COLLECTIVE WILL DO SO. WE SHOULD RESIT THE ANTI-DEFSNSE TREND IN SUPERFICIAL EXPRESSIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION. IT IS ILLUSORY THAT DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS CAN IN THEMSELVES CURE ALL THE ECONOMIC, ENERGY AND SOCIAL ILLS. COMMENTING AGAIN ABOUT THE NETHERLANDS' VIEW, IF THEY PERCEIVED DEFENSE AS A MATTER OF NATIONAL SURVIVAL, HE ESTIMATED THAT THEY COUD SUPPORT DEFENSE BUDGETS RUNNING FROM 6 TO 11 PERCENT OF THE GNP. HE NOTED A RELATIVELY LOW MOREALE IN SOME WESTERN SOCIETIES, BUT THIS CAN BE OFFSET IF WE WILL ALL HOLD TOGETHER IN A COMMON CAUSE.

9. MINISTER VREDELING (NETHERLANDS) NOTED THAT HE HAD SAID THAT NATO SHOULD "PUSH BACK" THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NOT "ABANDON" THAT ROLE. HE AGREED THAT NATO WOULD INDEED HAVE TO EMPHASIZE CONVENTIONAL FORCES IF THE NUCLEAR ROLE WERE

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PUSHED BACK. HE BELIEVED THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT TENDED TO INDICATE THAT, BECAUSE OF THE IMPLIED PARITY IN US-SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, THE US MIGHT NOT BE AS INCLINED IN THE FUTURE TO GIVE A GREEN LIGHT FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE AS IT HAD BEEN A FEW YEARS AGO. IN OTHER WORDS, HE BELIEVED THAT HIS NOTION OF A "PUSH BACK" AMLUNTED TO WHAT THE FRENCH WOULD CALL A "PROLONGEMENT" OF WHERE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US NOW FIND THEMSELVES.

10. MINISTER RICHARDSON (CANADA) SAID THAT IN DEALING WITH PUBLIC OPINION, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO POINT OUT TO PUBLICS THE BENEFITS OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET OTHER THAN NATIONAL SECURITY ITSELF. FOR EXAMPLE, IN CANDA THE ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN PERFORMING USEFUL WORK IN SUCH FIELDS AS SEARCH AND RESCUE, MERCY FLIGHTS AND YOUTH TRAINING.

11.MINISTER VAN DEN BOEYNANTS (BELGIUM) SAID HE THOUGHT VLADI-VOSTOK AMOUNTED TO AGREEMENT NOT TO ESCALATE THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE AND THEREFORE AMOUNTED TO AN ACCEPTANCE OF PARITY IN THAT AREA. IT NEVERTHELESS REMAINED TRUE THAT THE WILL AND DETERMINA-TION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING TACTICAL, IS THE BEST WAY TO SEE THAT THEY DO NOT GET USED. HE POINTED OUT THAT ON THREE OCCASIONS DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS, SOVIET LEADERS HAVE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THEY INTEND TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY POTENTIAL UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION BECOMES THE GREATEST MILITARY POWER IN THE WORLD.

12. NATO AMBASSADOR ERALP (TURKEY), SPEAKING FOR MINISTER SANCAR, SAID THAT TURKEY SUPPORTS THE THREE LEGS OF THE TRIAD AND AGREES

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WITH VAN DEN BOEYNANTS THAT THE ENEMY MUST PERCEIVE NATO WIL-
LINGNESS TO RESPOND TO ANY LEVEL OF AGRESSION. HE NOTED THAT
TURKEY HS BEEN MAKING VERY SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN DEFESNSE EX-
PENDITURES. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT MINISTER SANCAR WANTED TO MAKE
CLEAR HIS CONVICTION THAT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST ABSOLUTELY
BE USED WHEN NECESSARY.

13. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER REFERRED FAVORABLY TO A GERMAN FORMULA
WHICH HOLDS THAT NATO SHOULD, WITH RESPECT TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, DELAY THEIR USE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BUT USE THEM AS SOON
AS NECESSAARY. HE FELT THAT MINISTER VREDELING WOULD PRESUMABLY
ENDORSE THIS FORMULATION, AND NOTED THAT IT CONNOTES THE NEED
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FOR A GREATER EMPHASIS ON A STALWART CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY.

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USMISSION GENEVA
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LIMDIS

NATO NOW HAS MANY RUDIMENTS OF A STALWART CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY,
ALTHOUGH SOME SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES ARE DESIRABLE. HE SAID THAT
"A MAJOR CONVENTIONAL OPTION IS ATTAINABLE", ESPECIALLY WHEN ONE
CONSIDERS THAT CURRENTLY DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN WESTERN EUROPE
ARE COMPARABLE TO THOE OF THE SOVIET UNION. HE STATED THAT VLADI-
VOSTOK WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY WEAKEN THE WILLINGESS OF THE U.S.

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PRESIDENT TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHEN NECESSARY.
AS FOR POSSIBLE PROBLEMS IN PERSUADING PUBLICS IT WAS NECESSARY
SIMPLY TO KEEP REITERATING THE NECESSITY FOR ADEQUATE DEFENSES.
BEYOND THE SELF-DECEPTION OF DEFENSE "ON THE CHEAP" IS THE AT-
TITUDE THAT ALLIES CAN SOMEHOW MADE DO WITH LESS RESOURCES, AND BEYON
D
THAT IS AN EVENTUAL CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS NO REAL NEED FOR
DEFENSE BECAUSE OF APPARENT SOVIET GOOD WILL. WE MUST CONVEY TO
PUBLICS THE KEY QUESTION, "WHAT PRICE SURVIVAL?", AND THAT PRICE
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IS GOING TO BE GREATER THAN 3 PERCENT OF GNP.

14. MINISTR LEBER (FRG) DID NOT QUITE AGREE WITH WHAT HE SAW AS
SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S INTERPRETATION OF MINISTER VREDELING'S
REMARKS. RATHER, LEBER BELIEVED THAT MINISTER VREDELING WAS SAYING
THAT THE DUTCH DISTRUSTED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS SUCH AND
DID NOT WANT THEM AS PART OF THE DETERRENT SPECTRUM.

15. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE DID NOT
BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TRY TO PIN DOWN ANY SET OF SPECIFIC
REACTIONS TO MINISTER VREDELING'S REMARKS, BUT THAT IT MIGHT BE
USEFUL TO SEEK A "KERNEL OF TRUTH" WITHIN THOSE IDEAS THAT
MINISTER VREDELING COULD TAKE BACK TO HOLLAND. THE KERNEL THAT
SECRETARY SCHLESINGER SAW WAS THAT MINISTER VREDELING DID NOT
BELIEVE IN EXCESSIVE, REPEAT EXCESSIVE, DEPENDENCE ON TACTICAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE SECRETARY HOPED THAT MINISTER VREDELING
COULD TELL HIS PARTY AND HIS PEOPLE THATTHIS VIEW CARRIED WITH
IT A MORAL OBLIGATION TO DO SOMETHING ELSE - I.E., EMPHASIZE
AND BUILD UP CONVENTIONAL FORCES SO AS TO RAISE THE THRESHHOLD
OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR USE.

16. MINISTER VREDELING (NETHERLANDS) WARNED THAT WHAT HE HAD
REPORTED AS DUTCH ATTITUDES MIGHT SPREAD TO OTHER COUNTRIES --
FOR EXAMPLE, SCANDINAVIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND PERHAPS EVEN
GERMANY. VREDELING SPECIFICALLY CALLED ATTENTION TO WHAT HE
CALLED A GROWING INTEREST IN NUCLEAR FREE ZONES IN EUROPE. HE SAID
THE DUTCH DID INDEED WANT TO "PUSH BACK" BUT NOT "ABANDON" RELIANCE
ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NOR HAD MINISTER VREDELING MEANT
IN ANY WAY TO IMPLY THAT HE THOUGH THAT US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE
FORCES SHOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW FROM EUROPEAN NATIONS SUCH AS
HOLLAND. HOWEVER, HE DID HAVE TO SAY THAT THE TENDENCY IN HOLLAND
WAS TO HOLD THAT A PEACE RESTING ON FEAR OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR
WEAPONS COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED: THIS WAS AN IDEOLOGICAL AND PHILO-
SOPHICAL PROBLEM. NEVERTHELESS THE DUTCH DO ACCEPT THE CONSE-
QUENCE THAT THEY SHOULD NOT NEGLECT THEIR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE.
HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD
BE ELABORATING THE DUTCH POSITION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
AT ITS SESSIONS LATER IN THE WEEK.

17. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID HE WOULD ATTEMPT NO SUMMARY EXCEPT
TO NOTE THAT HE HAD FOUND THE PROCEEDINGS TO CONSTITUTE AN EX-

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TREMELY USEFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS THAT PARTICULARLY CONFIRMED THE
VALUE OF MINISTERIAL RESTRICTED SESSIONS WHERE PARTICIPANTS FEEL
THEY CAN SPEAK FREELY. BRUCE

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